I'm surprised you didn't bring in the Jewish concepts of levels of giving, with the highest being where your giving is anonymous and you also don't know the recipient.
I sometimes find it weird that non-halachic Jewish movements threw out Kabbalah but kept Tikkun Olam, one of the key concepts of Lurianic Kabbalah, as a metaphor. Among those who treat the Zohar as scripture, Tikkun Olam is the result of performing mitzvot - a rather arcane and unintuitive way to solve arcane damage to the cosmos. Whereas post-Haskalah Jewish movements invoke Tikkun Olam so they can make progressive activism their actual religious practice.
I guess if I were to try to make a halachic case analogous to the virtue ethics case, I'd need to argue that while some mitzvot can be obeyed solely because they're mitzvot, the tzedakah-related ones are only truly obeyed when they're done in expectation of positive worldly consequences. Which is supported by Deuteronomy 15:7 and 15:10, which command us not only to help the needy, but to do so with compassion and optimism.
I'm surprised you didn't bring in the Jewish concepts of levels of giving, with the highest being where your giving is anonymous and you also don't know the recipient.
Heh, I have an outline in my draft folder for "Maimonides's laws of charity" which may or may not turn into a discussion of this.
I love that my brain thought of something similar to your brain! Connected across the country!
This is beautiful. And right. I'm not sure I have the heart, so to speak, to read the Emma Goldberg article. But I think I will try.....
I sometimes find it weird that non-halachic Jewish movements threw out Kabbalah but kept Tikkun Olam, one of the key concepts of Lurianic Kabbalah, as a metaphor. Among those who treat the Zohar as scripture, Tikkun Olam is the result of performing mitzvot - a rather arcane and unintuitive way to solve arcane damage to the cosmos. Whereas post-Haskalah Jewish movements invoke Tikkun Olam so they can make progressive activism their actual religious practice.
I endorse this description of what we're doing.
I guess if I were to try to make a halachic case analogous to the virtue ethics case, I'd need to argue that while some mitzvot can be obeyed solely because they're mitzvot, the tzedakah-related ones are only truly obeyed when they're done in expectation of positive worldly consequences. Which is supported by Deuteronomy 15:7 and 15:10, which command us not only to help the needy, but to do so with compassion and optimism.
That said, I'm generally in agreement with the opinions presented in this article. Shame on the NYT.